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A V B AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
QUEBEC (ERIC V LOLA)—THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COHABITING 




On January 25, 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada released its 
decision in a case popularly known as Eric v Lola.1 The issue 
raised by the parties was whether the exclusion of de facto2 
spouses in Quebec from property division and spousal support 
violated the equality rights guaranteed by section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 The majority of 
the Supreme Court held that there was an infringement of 
section 15, but the majority that upheld the law was composed 
of four judges who found no infringement and only one who 
found it justifiable under section 1, resulting controversially in 
Quebec being the only province in the country in which people 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
∗ * Natasha Bakht is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Ottawa. This paper was initially presented at the County 
of Carleton Law Association Conference in April 2013. I would like 
to thank Jordan Palmer for his invaluable contribution as a research 
assistant. I am also grateful to Lynda Collins, Vanessa Gruben and 
the anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful comments. 
1  Quebec (AG) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61, [Eric v Lola]. 
2  I use the terms de facto or cohabiting spouses in this article to refer to 
couples that cohabit but are unmarried and not in a registered 
domestic partnership.  
3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter]. 




cohabiting in a conjugal relationship are not entitled to spousal 
support.4  
 
This paper will comment on Eric v Lola by comparing 
it to an earlier family law case, Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 
v Walsh.5 It will consider the very similar arguments made in 
these cases about the “choice” to marry and the economic 
consequences that befall women when legislative benefits 
given to married people are not extended to cohabiting couples. 
The paper will argue that although the consequences of the 
decision in Eric v Lola reinforces Walsh in that unmarried 
cohabiting couples in some provinces still do not have the same 
legislative benefits extended to them upon relationship 
breakdown, the equality analysis in Eric v Lola in fact 
overturns Walsh. The example of same-sex spousal litigation, 
which moved from legal defeats to legal wins, is used to 
suggest that the extension of equal rights to cohabitants may 
also take time. The incremental evolution of equality 
jurisprudence among other changes offers hope that cohabiting 
couples may eventually have full marital benefits extended to 
them. 
 
COMPARING “CHOICE” IN ERIC V LOLA AND 
WALSH V BONA 
 
The couple in Eric v Lola had been in a de facto relationship 
for seven years and had three children together. “Lola” was 17, 
living with her parents in their native country and attending 
school when the couple met. “Eric” was 32 and running an 
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4  Over one third of cohabiting spouses in Quebec are unmarried, while 
in the rest of Canada only 16.7% of census families are cohabiting 
spouses (Statistics Canada, 2012, Portrait of Families and Living 
Arrangements in Canada: Families, Households and Marital Status, 
Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-312-X201 1001, Ottawa, Ontario, 
p 6) 
5  Nova Scotia (AG) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325 [Walsh]. 




international business. “Eric” provided “Lola” with financial 
support so that she could continue her schooling. During the 
time the couple was together, “Lola” did not hold employment 
outside of the home. “Lola” had wanted to get married, but 
“Eric” refused.6   
 
This case replicates in many ways the arguments made 
in the earlier Supreme Court of Canada decision, Walsh, which 
held that the exclusion of unmarried different-sex couples from 
the provincial default property regime was constitutional. Ms. 
Walsh and Mr. Bona cohabited in a conjugal relationship for 
approximately 10 years and two children were born of the 
relationship. Upon separation, Mr. Bona retained all of the 
properties in his name, including a cottage, a vehicle, pensions 
and RRSPs, worth approximately $116,000.7 Ms. Walsh sought 
a declaration that the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act8 
was unconstitutional in failing to provide her with the 
presumption, applicable to married spouses, of an equal 
division of matrimonial property.  
 
Ms. Walsh argued that the decision to marry may not 
always be under one partner’s control, particularly where the 
other person refuses to marry or register a domestic 
partnership.9 For both Walsh and “Lola”, this was the case. 
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6  Eric v Lola, supra note 1 at para 5. Like other couples whose family 
law cases find their way to the Supreme Court of Canada, “Eric” and 
“Lola” were wealthy. Though “Lola” was not entitled to spousal 
support and division of matrimonial property, she was unlikely to be 
left destitute because of the high child support awards she was 
entitled to. Nonetheless the implications of this case on poorer 
families are critical as the denial of spousal support and division of 
property will exacerbate the economic consequences of separation on 
women and children. 
7  Walsh, supra note 5 at para 3. 
8  Matrimonial Property Act, RSNS 1989, c 275. 
9  Ibid at para 56. 




They wanted to marry, but their partners refused, leaving them 
in a legally disadvantageous position compared to married 
people at the end of their relationships.10  By contrast, the 
Attorney Generals and male partners11 in these cases argued 
that excluding cohabiting couples from the benefits afforded 
married couples corresponded to the choice made by 
cohabiting couples not to marry. In not marrying, they were 
making a deliberate choice not to have the benefits associated 
with marriage extended to them. The majority of the Walsh 
Court agreed with this argument. It held that persons entering 
into a conjugal relationship without marrying are not entering 
into a relationship on the same terms as persons who marry, 
thus, any differential treatment in the legislation is not 
discriminatory and does not affect their dignity.  
 
Much of the majority’s analysis in Walsh focused on 
the conscious “choice” made by cohabiting couples to avoid 
the institution of marriage and the legal consequences that flow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  Angela Campbell has argued that those women in Quebec who work 
in the paid labour force and make more money than their conjugal 
partners may benefit from Eric v Lola because they would not be 
obligated to pay spousal support at the dissolution of their 
relationship. Angela Campbell, “Supreme Court’s common-law 
decision may be good for women”, The Globe and Mail (January 25 
2013). While this may be true, most women do not find themselves in 
this situation. A Statistics Canada survey indicates that the average 
female earnings in 2011 for all Canadian earners was $32,100, only 
66.7% of the average male earnings ($48, 100) and with a median 
female income of only 66.5% of the median male earnings. See 
Canadian Socio-Economic Management System (CANSIM), "Table 
202-0102: Average female and male earnings, and female-to-male 
earnings ratio, by work activity, 2011 constant dollars", online: 
Statistics Canada <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/ >. 
11 “Eric” or “B” was a party to the case at the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In Walsh, the male partner, Bona, was not a party to the case at the 
Supreme Court as the couple had settled between them property 
division subsequent to leave being granted to the Supreme Court. 




from it. The Court held that to bind de facto couples to the 
same division of property rules as married couples effectively 
nullifies the individual’s freedom to choose alternate family 
forms and to have that choice respected and legitimated by the 
state.12  
 
There has been much scholarly analysis about the 
Walsh decision,13 its “theoretical freedom to choose” for some, 
and its impact on vulnerable individuals, women in particular. 
The research demonstrates that when relationships end, both 
members of the couple will suffer negative economic 
consequences, but women in particular bear the greatest 
burden.14 Legislative schemes such as property sharing and 
spousal support were primarily enacted in order to alleviate 
some of the economic difficulties that arise for those most 
vulnerable upon the breakdown of a family. Moreover, in 
entering a non-marriage but long-term conjugal relationship, 
one or both partners may be forgoing economic advancement, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Walsh, supra note 5 at para 43. See also Maxine Eichner, “Marriage 
and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of 
Intimate Relationships Between Adults” (2007) 30 Harvard J L & 
Gender 25. 
13  See for example, Carol Rogerson, “Developments in Family Law: 
The 2002-2003 Term” (2003) 22 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 273; DA Rollie 
Thompson, “Walsh v Bona: Annotated” (2003) 32 RFL (5th) 87; 
Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada: Cases and 
Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 391. See also 
Robert Leckey, “Gimme Shelter” (2011) 34 Dal LJ 197, who prefers 
a narrow reading of Walsh leaving open the status of measures 
protecting the family home as shelter. 
14  See for example LJ Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The 
Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and 
Children in America (New York: Free Press, 1985) at 323 and Ross 
Finnie, “Women, Men, and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: 
Evidence from the Canadian Longitudinal Data” (1993) 30:2 
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 205. 




opportunity or even self-support. Where people in de facto 
relationships do not have access to the entire “economic 
readjustment” package15  available to married persons upon 
relationship dissolution, we see an exacerbation of the 
feminization of poverty16 by leaving many cohabiting women 
economically devastated by relationship breakdown. The 
dissenting opinions in both Walsh and Eric v Lola offer ample 
and compelling reasons why no legislative distinction ought to 
be maintained between married and cohabiting couples such as 
equal need and the illusory nature of personal autonomy in this 
status, while still permitting couples to agree to opt out of such 
legislative schemes should they so desire. 
 
The decision in Eric v Lola reinforces Walsh, in that de 
facto couples in some provinces and territories still do not have 
the same legislative benefits extended to them upon 
relationship breakdown like married couples. However, the 
court’s analysis in Eric v Lola differs from that in Walsh, 
which may have important implications for couples in 
Alberta,17 New Brunswick,18 Newfoundland,19 Nova Scotia,20 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary 
(Concord: Captus Press, 2012) at 412. Cohabiting couples that wish 
to claim property division on separation must rely either on a 
domestic contract or the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, 
proving which can be a cumbersome process that is lengthy and 
expensive. See Philip M Epstein, “Annotation to Kerr v. Baranow 
and Vanasse v. Seguin and Rubin v. Gendemann” (2011) 93 RFL 
(6th) 192. 
16  Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 99 DLR (4th) 456. See also 
Kathleen Lahey, “Women, Substantive Equality, and Fiscal Policy: 
Gender-Based Analysis of Taxes, Benefits, and Budgets” (2010) 22 
CJWL 27. 
17  Matrimonial Property Act, RSA 2000, c M-8. 
18  Marital Property Act, RSNB 2012, c 107. 
19  Family Law Act, RSNL 1990, c F-2. 




Ontario,21 Prince Edward Island22 and the Yukon Territory,23 as 
these provinces and territories do not automatically extend a 
property division scheme to unmarried couples. Currently, only 
Manitoba,24 Saskatchewan,25 British Columbia,26 the Northwest 
Territories27 and Nunavut28 extend the full status of marital 






20  Matrimonial Property Act, supra note 8. However, a partnership 
registered under Part II of the Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494 
is eligible for property division. 
21  Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F-3. 
22  Family Law Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-2.1. 
23  Family Property and Support Act, RSY 2002, c 83. 
24 See The Family Property Act, CCSM c F25.  
25  The Family Property Act, Chapter F-6.3 of the Statutes of 
Saskatchewan, 1997 (effective March 1, 1998) as amended by the 
Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1998, c 48; 2000, c 70; 2001, c 34 and 51; 
2010, c 10; and 2012, c 24. 
26  Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, entry into force on 18 March 2013.  
27  Family Law Act, SNWT 1997, c 18.  
28  Nunavut’s law on this topic incorporated the statute of the Northwest 
Territories and have not been altered. See Family Law Act, SNWT 
1997, c 18, as duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 
1993, c 28. 
29  Each of the provinces and territories that extend the status of marital 
partners to cohabitants require a minimum period of cohabitation of 2 
years. In addition, section 13.1 of Manitoba’s Vital Statistics Act, 
CCSM, c V60, allows for registration of a cohabiting domestic 
partnership at any time during a relationship. 




EVOLVING EQUALITY FOR UNMARRIED 
COHABITANTS 
 
In Walsh, the majority of the Court held that there was no 
section 15 violation in excluding different-sex cohabiting 
couples from the matrimonial property sharing scheme in the 
legislation. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was the sole 
dissenter, finding that the needs of married and unmarried 
cohabitants are often functionally equivalent. In Eric v Lola, 
five of the nine Supreme Court judges, including all four of the 
female judges, held the opposite of the Walsh majority: that the 
exclusion of de facto couples from all measures adopted to 
protect married persons violated section 15 of the Charter. 
Madam Justice Abella, writing for the majority, stated: 
“fairness requires that we look at the content of the 
relationship’s social package, not at how it is wrapped.”30 She 
noted that: “[t]he right to support – and the obligation to pay it 
– did not rest on the legal status of either husband or wife, but 
on the reality of the dependence or vulnerability that the 
spousal relationship had created.” 31 
 
Thus, the majority of the Supreme Court effectively 
overturned Walsh.32 What has changed in the eleven years 
since Walsh for the Court to reverse its position? The day-to-
day realities of married/registered relationships versus de facto 
relationships have remained similar both in relation to each 
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30  Eric v Lola, supra note 1 at para 285. 
31  Ibid at para 296. 
32  Indeed, five of the nine judges state in Eric v Lola that they decline to 
follow Walsh. See Abella J at para 338 who notes: “I would, with 
respect, decline to follow Walsh.” See also para 384 per Deschamps J 
and paras 347 and 422 where the Chief Justice states: “Like my 
colleague Abella J., I am of the view that Walsh does not bind this 
Court in the present case. Walsh…was decided at an earlier point in 
our evolving appreciation of s. 15.” 




other and in terms of the number of years that have passed 
since the Walsh decision. What has changed, however, is 
equality jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in R v Kapp33 and 
Withler v Canada34 undertook a revision of the Law35 test after 
considering a number of criticisms by leading constitutional 
law experts. 36  While the section 15 equality test remains 
essentially the same in that it asks whether a legislative 
distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground is 
discriminatory, the Court encouraged a more flexible, 
contextual inquiry that moved away from a rigid template to 
one that actually furthered substantive equality.  
 
The Walsh majority’s decision was problematic 
following the Kapp/Withler evolutions for two reasons. First, in 
their analysis that common law couples are free to choose to 
marry, the Walsh majority effectively collapsed public interest 
considerations of the reasonableness of the legislation, a matter 
to be analyzed under section 1, into the section 15 analysis. By 
so doing, the claimant bore the burden of proof that should 
properly have fallen to the responding government. Second, the 
effect of combining respect for choice into the equality analysis 
negated the recognition of marital status as an analogous 
ground per Miron v Trudel.37 As Justice Abella noted, the 
reasoning of the Walsh majority illustrates the problems 
associated with finding the perfect comparator group: “In 
Walsh, the fact that the comparator group of married spouses 
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33  R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483. 
34  Withler v Canada, 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396. 
35  Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 
SCR 497 [Law]. 
36  See for example Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre eds, Diminishing 
Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2006). 
37  Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693. 




was not perfectly mirrored by the group of unmarried spouses, 
based on the heterogeneity of the latter, short-circuited the 
analysis of the actual adverse impact experienced by a 
significant proportion of unmarried spouses.”38 
 
Thus the arguments concerning freedom of choice and 
individual autonomy that were found to belie a section 15 
infringement in Walsh, were relegated to section 1 in Eric v 
Lola. Despite the divisions in the Court, only Justice Abella’s 
opinion found that exclusion from the property division regime 
could not be saved under section 1. Of the other four judges 
who found a section 15 violation, three held that spousal 
support is distinct from property division and thus could not be 
saved under section 1. The Chief Justice held that all of the 
Civil Code’s distinctions as between de jure and de facto 
spouses, though discriminatory, could be saved under section 
1.39  
 
If a constitutional challenge like Walsh were to arise in 
Ontario or another province/territory where unmarried couples 
are excluded from the legislative property regime, it is likely 
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38  Eric v Lola, supra note 1 at para 346. In Hodge v Canada (Minister of 
Human Resources Development) 2004 SCC 65, a similar issue with 
the comparator group analysis arose when the Court held that for the 
purposes of survivor’s pension under the Canada Pension Plan, 
former unmarried spouses were properly compared not with separated, 
married spouses, but with divorced former spouses, resulting in the 
loss of their right to make a claim as soon as cohabitation ended. 
39  Some have suggested that the Chief Justice’s approach could be 
characterized “as an astute balancing about a politically sensitive 
issue” in the wake of some hostility to the Charter in Quebec. Some 
Quebecers view the Charter as an imposition by Ottawa since it was 
part of a Constitution that Quebec did not sign on to in 1982. See 
Nicholas Bala & Robert Leckey “Family Law and the Charter’s First 
30 Years: An Impact Delayed, Deep, and Declining but Lasting” 
(2013) 32 Can Fam LQ 22 at 34-35.  




that the Court would initially find that such a distinction is 
discriminatory and contrary to section 15. The discriminatory 
impact of the exclusion of cohabiting couples from the 
property-sharing regime in, for example, Ontario’s Family Law 
Act,40  would be on the basis of marital status, but strong 
arguments could be made about the gendered effects of the 
differential treatment of married and unmarried spouses. As 
LEAF argued in Eric v Lola, an examination of the lived 
effects and systemic outcomes would show that the 
legislation perpetuates prejudice and disadvantage experienced 
by women in cohabiting relationships by disregarding need.41  
 
Whether such an infringement would survive a section 
1 analysis would depend on a number of factors. Some may 
argue that the overturning of Walsh on the basis of section 15 
means little if a majority of the nine judges would uphold any 
discrimination under section 1.42 Indeed, there is a dearth of 
successful equality litigants even since the Kapp/Withler 
reformulation, despite the Court’s renewed support of 
substantive equality.  But I would suggest that a finding of no 
infringement of section 15 in Walsh to a prima facie 
infringement of section 15 in Eric v Lola is a noteworthy 
progression where there is a move to section 1 and the burden 
shifts to the government.  
 
For the moment, Justice Abella is the only member of 
the Court who perceived no meaningful distinction between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40  Supra note 21.  
41  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 (Factum of the 
Intervener, Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund), online: 
LEAF <http://leaf.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/LEAF-
SCC-Factum-Final.pdf>.  
42  See for example Patricia Hughes, “Supreme Court of Canada 
Equality Jurisprudence and ‘Everyday Life’” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev 
(2d) 245 at 255.  




property and support worth justifying discriminatory legislation. 
I would echo the comments made by Professors Bala and 
Leckey that of the Supreme Court Justices, Justice Abella has 
the greatest experience in family law and offered the most 
fulsome and sophisticated analysis of the issue of choice:  
 
She accepted that legislative recognition of a 
true mutual choice not to assume obligations in a 
de facto partnership might be constitutionally 
permissible, for instance by a presumption of 
inclusion subject to a consensual opting out. 
Given the vulnerability and lack of legal 
information of many de facto spouses, however, 
the utter lack of any protective framework, 
modifiable only by consensual opting-in or other 
contractual arrangement, did not minimally limit 
the right to equality.43 
 
A legislative scheme that is presumptively inclusive of 
cohabiting couples, 44  but that nonetheless permits them to 
contract out of such a default scheme, is beneficial because it 
automatically protects those most vulnerable who would not 
have the resources or knowledge to opt out, while still 
permitting those who wish to be independent as to property to 
retain individual autonomy.45 It would also rectify the ongoing 
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43  Bala & Leckey, supra note 39 at 33. Justice Abella’s dissent mirrors 
in many ways the dissent of Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in 
Walsh, supra note 5.  
44  For further discussion in a similar vein, see Julia L Cardozo, “Let My 
Love Open the Door: The Case for Extending Marital Privileges to 
Unmarried Cohabitants” (2010) 10:2 U Md LJ Race Relig Gender & 
Class 375. 
45  Zheng Wu, Cohabitation: An Alternative Form of Family Living 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 167. See also Winnifred 
Holland, “Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The 




confusion among many as to the different consequences of 
marriage and cohabitation. 46  Property division upon 
relationship breakdown is particularly important where most of 
the couple’s wealth is held in a single-family home, which is 
quite often the case for most middle-income families. 
 
THE ANALOGY OF SAME-SEX SPOUSAL 
LITIGATION 
 
I suspect the Court’s recent decision will discourage further 
litigation on this issue in the near future. However, the 
evolution of the majority’s analysis in Eric v Lola is potentially 
a sign that foreshadows deeper changes to the law. If same-sex 
spousal litigation can be used as an analogy, we may be 
steadily heading in the direction of full recognition of rights for 
cohabiting spouses at the end of their relationships. There has 
been an evolution in the status of same-sex spousal rights over 
the years, from initial findings of non-discrimination in 
Layland v Ontario47 and Egan v Canada,48 to a finding of 
discrimination in M v H,49 and finally, to full recognition with 
Halpern v Canada50 and Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage.51 In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation” (2000) 17:1 Can J Fam L 
114 at 151-167.  
46  Wu, ibid.  
47  Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations), 
[1993] OJ no 575, 14 OR (3d) 658 (Ont Div Ct) dismissing a claim 
by same-sex partners for the right to marry. 
48  Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609. 
49  M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3, 171 DLR (4th) 577. 
50  Halpern v Canada (AG) (2002), 95 CRR (2d) 1, 60 OR (3d) 321 (Div 
Ct), upheld and with an expanded remedy in (2003), 65 OR (3d) 161 
(CA). 
51  Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698. 




this slow and incremental way, recognition of full spousal 
status for cohabitants may well be in our future.52  
 
With renewed emphasis on a substantive equality 
framework that examines the actual impact of distinctions in 
legislative benefits as between married and cohabiting couples 
rather than a philosophy of choice that only protects the partner 
wanting to avoid obligations, we have seen some changes in 
the Court’s analytic approach. A prima facie infringement of 
section 15 and Justice Abella’s strong dissent may be 
predictive of future judicial approaches.  
 
We may well need more changes such as to the 
composition of the Court,53 including perhaps an increased 
number of women judges, given the strong inclinations along 
gender lines in these cases. In Eric v Lola, all of the women 
judges found an infringement of section 15 of the Charter. In 
Walsh, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé found an infringement 
of section 15 while Madam Justices McLachlin and Arbour did 
not. Justice Arbour has since left the Court and Chief Justice 
McLachlin has changed her view of the discrimination analysis 
for unmarried cohabitants under section 15. Clearly, women 
judges do not guarantee a particular result on constitutional 
issues, but the inclusion of more women judges is likely to 




52  For the progression and tactics that were used in the same-sex 
spousal public interest litigation see Christine Davies, “Canadian 
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: Individual Rights, Community 
Strategy” (2008) 66:2 UT Fac L Rev 101. 
53  Indeed, the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada has already 
changed since Eric v Lola with the departures of Madam Justice 
Deschamps and Mr. Justice Fish, the appointment of Mr. Justice 
Wagner and the upcoming mandatory retirement of Mr. Justice LeBel.  




Diversity in the makeup of a group not only 
liberates members of the minority group to be 
more forthcoming about their views and to share 
information they may have that is unique, but it 
also induces members of the majority to state 
their views more explicitly and to re-examine 
their assumptions. [This process] leads to more 
robust and well-informed decisions.54  
 
Indeed, retired Supreme Court Justice Marie 
Deschamps has expressed public disappointment when the 
number of women judges on the highest court slipped from 
four to three.55 The upcoming retirement of Mr. Justice Louis 
LeBel offers another opportunity to rectify this situation. 
 
Some have suggested that registered partnerships may 
be an alternative for women in cohabitating relationships until 
full benefits are extended to cohabitants. Several provinces 
including Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Alberta and Quebec have 
created registered partnerships that extend the benefits of 
marriage, including property division, to cohabiting people.56 
This alternative legislative model is typically open to both 
same-sex and opposite sex partners, but was initially created 
for same-sex couples when marriage had not been legally 
available to them.57 They remain for the most part unused.58 
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54  Beth Bilson, “A Dividend of Diversity: The Impact of Diversity on 
Organizational Decision Making” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 9 at 16. 
55  Sean Fine, “Gender balance at issue with Supreme Court vacancy”, 
The Globe and Mail (September 25 2013) A7. 
56  For a fulsome discussion of registered domestic partnerships see 
Nicole LaViolette, “Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered 
Partnerships as an Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in 
Canada” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 115. 
57  Ibid at 117. 
58  Ibid at 157-158. 




However, registered partnerships are beneficial to those who 
reject the institution of marriage or who are not in a conjugal 
relationship but wish to undertake mutual obligations.59 Neither 
Walsh nor Eric v Lola preclude this type of legislation. Indeed, 
the cases suggest that the provinces retain autonomy in 
defining the mutual rights and obligations of unmarried 
spouses.60 Importantly, registered partnerships may not be a 
viable option in terms of assisting women economically at the 
end of their relationships where their partners are unwilling to 
register the relationship. Like marriage, registered partnerships 
still require a positive step in order to be eligible for property 
division, which one member of the couple may not be willing 
to take. So the fact that civil unions exist in Quebec did not 
assist “Lola”, since “Eric” was unwilling to formalize their 
relationship whether through marriage or some other means. 
Thus, such women would remain susceptible to all of the same 
economic vulnerabilities upon relationship breakdown.  
 
We need legislators to take the lead in extending full 
benefits to cohabitants without the need for any extra steps, 
which would diminish the urgency for judicial change. These 
developments are already on the horizon in some provinces. 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan both have legislation, enacted 
before Walsh, that provides for virtual equality between 
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59  Alberta, for example, has enacted the Adult Interdependent 
Relationships Act, SA 2002, c A-4.5, which governs unmarried 
partnerships. Under this Act, relationships need not be conjugal, but 
must be a “relationship of interdependence” for a continuous period 
of 3 years or “some permanence” with a child to be eligible for 
coverage.  
60  Eric v Lola, supra note 1 at para 279: “Provincial legislatures have 
chosen to regulate the private relationships of common law spouses 
on the basis of their own provinces’ legislative objectives. Today, 
each province defines the effects of de facto unions or common law 
relationships differently, which is a mark of Canadian legal pluralism.” 
See also Walsh, supra note 5 at paras 77 and 161.  




cohabitants and married spouses.61 De facto couples are already 
included in the property schemes of the Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut. 62  As of very recently, British Columbia’s 
legislation extends marital property rights to long-term 
unmarried partners.63 Even in Quebec, following the decision 
in Eric v Lola, Justice Minister Bertrand St-Arnaud initially 
acknowledged a willingness to “reflect on the possibility of 
changing the law in order to grant greater economic protection 
to unmarried women involved in a common law 
relationship.” 64  This was followed by the creation of a 
consultative committee with a mandate to consider whether 
large-scale reform of family law is in order in Quebec.65 Each 
of these developments are positive progressions that we should 
see as getting us closer to full recognition of cohabitants’ rights.  
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61  See supra notes 24 and 25. 
62  See supra notes 27 and 28.  
63 See supra note 26.  
64  Rhéal Séguin, “Despite top court ruling, Quebec open to changing 
spousal-support law”, The Globe & Mail, Jan 25, 2013 online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com>.  
65  Minister of Justice, Quebec, News Release “Le ministre de la Justice 
annonce la création d'un comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille” 
(19 April 2013) online: Portail Québec 
<http://communiques.gouv.qc.ca >. 
